During an interview with Atlantic’s Jeffery Goldberg, John Kerry stated that “Iran has chosen not to pursue a bomb even when they had materials to build 10-12 of them”. This is in spite of a large spectrum of international relations theories which fail to explain Iran’s behavior, from balance of power to mutually assured destruction (MAD). Since the dawn of its creation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been a source of bafflement for politicians and theoreticians alike. The unique worldview envisaged by the early revolutionaries once divided the world into the “oppressed” and “oppressing” countries. During that time and throughout the 1980s, everyone’s thought-frame was set into the “Eastern” and “Western” blocs. Now, after more than three decades later, the prevalent theories of IR are still unable to come up with an explanation for the Iranian Revolution. In the end it was Imam Khomeini’s vision which outlived and predicted the downfall of its preceding worldview, the bipolar system ceased to exist.

Prior to the Vienna Accords, Iran’s breakout capability has been widely regarded as one of the key – if not the most crucial – parameters of the agreement and how it must be kept at a minimum of one year. While all the concerns regarding the breakout capability is completely understandable, this papers aims to explore the thought-processes of Iranian decision makers and see whether it is “preferable” for them to pursue a much shorter breakout time in the long run, regardless of the state of the agreement.

Despite its shortcomings, I’ve chosen Graham T. Allison’s models of decision making which is explained in his book “Essence of Decision” as the main theoretical framework for this paper. Based on Allison’s speculations, there are three viable approaches in state decision-making: The Rational Actor, Organizational Process and the Governmental Politics models. By delving into these different approaches we see whether they do prescribe an Iranian breakout time which is shorter than the internationally permitted time-frame or whether a well hidden project for the bomb does in fact benefit the perceived national interests of Iran. Since no analysis of this kind can be done without a background check on the famous fatwa on the ban of the WMDs (weapons of mass destruction), we are going to analyze the history behind it and see whether it can really translate into smart power for Iran or is it merely a stalling technique with nothing more than a religious ideology to endorse, while the same ideology can be used in disregarding the fatwa (i.e. Taqiya).

Since its establishment by a popular revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has grappled with several challenges. The post-revolution foreign policy of Iran has been based on a number of cherished ideals and objectives embedded in the country’s constitution. These include the preservation of Iran’s independence, territorial integrity, national security and the achievement of a long-term, sustainable national development.

Not so long after its establishment, Islamic Republic was forced to enter in a war of attrition with its neighbor and subsequently more than 100,000 of its civilians and armed forces were subject to Iraqi chemical attacks, a figure which is by far the greatest death toll due to unconventional weapons since WWII.

In 1983, Iraq started using chemical weapons like mustard gas against Iran. While the military leaders urged former Supreme Leader Imam Khomeini to retaliate in kind, it has never been proved that Iran used chemical weapons as well. Instead, the Supreme Leader issued a fatwa banning the ownership and use of chemical weapons. In the fatwa he declared nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as irreconcilable with the Quran on the grounds that those weapons do not distinguish between combatants, noncombatants and the environment. The Quran states that the killing of innocent people is equal to killing all people on earth, which is clearly incompatible with the use of chemical weapons.

The fatwa at that time fulfilled another function, besides its direct legal effect as a statement based on Islamic law, it ascribed power and legitimation to the Shia clergy in Iran and also those residing in Iraq. It strengthened the power of the ideologically inspired clergy, which in return support the Supreme Leader’s decisions outside the boundaries of the Islamic Republic. A fatwa on chemical weapons thus benefited the internal stability of Iran, while at the same time elevated the Supreme Leader’s image of goodwill in Iraq and beyond. Subsequently, the bulk of the Shia clergy supported this political move, even though some may have lived in the country of a Sunni ruler which declared war on Iran, at the end of the day, it did not stop them from appreciating the logic behind this genuine move.

Furthermore this particular fatwa nourished the international status of Iran as a strong, independent, Islamic nation. This image of Iran could enhance cooperation with other ‘independent’ or Islamic countries, as those countries would perceive Iran as a strong potential partner, and could enhance the export of the revolution to other countries. Also, in broader international arena, it generated immense credibility for Iran and its standing in the CWC (Convention on Chemical Weapons) as a staunch supporter of chemical weapons disarmament.

The same goes for Iran and its standing as a signatory of the NPT. In 2004, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a similar fatwa regarding the ban on development, stockpiling and the use of the nuclear weapons. Since the announcement of fatwa in 2004, the topic has been much debated, as the effects of such a fatwa would certainly have significant implications on Iran’s nuclear energy program.

The main assumption behind “The Rational Actor” model is the mainstream role of the state as the primary actor and how it acts like a single entity which is always calculating costs versus benefits with regard to its utilities. As mentioned in the case of the fatwa on the ban of the chemical weapon, while it may looked like an ideologically driven move from the outside, it indeed generated enough political goodwill and benefited Iran in ways that it would have never achieved if the country had chosen to retaliate during the war. The same goes for the ban on nuclear weapons, which advantages of its implementing would highly outweigh its disadvantages. Firstly, building and research for the nuclear weapons bear high costs; besides there are high risks involving the stockpiling of fissile materials. Evidently, during the process of production of nuclear weapons, the national security is considerably at risk. Furthermore, contributing to the nuclear proliferation decreases international security due to the “Security Dilemma”. For these reasons, it can’t be a rational objective for Iran to build and own nuclear weapons. If Iran doesn’t proliferate, the regional security of the Middle East increases. The high costs and risks, the decline in international security and the vulnerability during the production of the weapons can result in the rational decision of Iran not to produce nuclear weapons. Ergo, issuing a fatwa on those weapons is only rational. Because through issuing a fatwa, the rational intentions of Iran are hidden behind ideology and the Shia clergy supports this “ideological” and political decision. Adding to this, there is a possibility that the international community as well as the U.S. Congress is convinced of the validity of this fatwa and acts accordingly. Then, in the ideal case, the sanctions against Iran would be terminated, and its limited enrichment for civil purposes would be universally accepted. On top of that, the nuclear fatwa, like the chemical fatwa by Imam Khomeini, can strengthen the international status of Iran as a strong Islamic country. In this way, Iran can take a leading position for countries with a Muslim population, and promote cooperation and the strengthening of an Islamic alternative to the West while paving the way for furthering the agenda put by the NPT.

Although the “Governmental Politics” model envisaged by Allison cannot be fully compatible with Iran’s decision making system but for the sake of analyzing, we choose a reductionist approach. According to Allison, a nation’s actions with this model is best understood as a result of politicking and negotiations by its top leaders. In this case, if the President of Iran or the head of the Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, is in favor of going the nuke path, he has to bring his case to the Supreme National Security Council, and even then, he will certainly fail to persuade this body because the fatwa is firmly based on Islamic jurisprudence. We have to keep in mind that Iran has constitutionally committed itself to protect Islamic values and subjects all over the world [Article 152 of Iranian constitution states that “The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial integrity, the defense of the rights of all Muslims, nonalignment with respect to the domineering superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peaceful relations with all non-belligerent States.”].

The council is bound not to undermine its commitment by some realpolitik assumptions that bears such high risks, unless it somehow acts as a collective and separated entity in the establishment. But that falls under the category of “Organizational Process” model which happens as follows:

If the Supreme National Security Council decides to pursue a hidden nuke project in spite of the directives from the Supreme Leader and acts in a totally independent way, or if it is easier to imagine, keep the façade of acting independently while maintaining the connection to the top, as was the case with the Japanese army in WWII, still the consequences will nevertheless haunt the nation. The important thing about fatwa is that it can’t be simply undone since the statement has become a de facto international commitment. In case of a breach, Iran will lose its credibility as well as its standing in the international community. With time, such a statement will be integrated into the worldview of Iranian citizens as well as other countries’ expectations of Iranian behavior. Should Iran adopt a different stance concerning the WMDs, the international community would react with deep mistrust. Furthermore, Iran might then lose its image of being an Islamic country, because of acting against fundamental principles of Islam.

Conclusion

The bulk of the article has tried to picture different models of Iranian decision-making procedure regardless of the state of the Vienna Accords. Iran will not produce the bomb even if it does not ratify the agreement, not only because of ideological considerations but out of purely practical calculations. The fatwa on the ban of nuclear weapons is a matter of the state’s survival as much as it is integral for adhering to the tenets of the Islamic Revolution. No matter how naysayers beg to differ, the stakes are simply too high.